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Abstract:  
 
The paper analyses venture capitalists’ selection process in biotechnology ventures. 
Biotech ventures operate in an extremely risky environment making this an interesting 
research setting. The majority of venture capitalists exclude certain biotech sectors ex-
ante because of regulatory uncertainty, the long development process to a market ready 
product and the difficulty to understand the technology. The more thorough due 
diligence process focuses on financial, market and technology criteria. Management 
team capabilities are more important for later stage investors, whereas early stage 
investors expect to have an impact on the future recruiting of professional managers. 
Despite the higher risk of biotech investments, we find no evidence that VCs require 
higher hurdle rates or more complete contracts for these investments, compared to 
investments in other technology-based companies. The most important reason for not 
reaching an investment agreement is disagreement over valuation, due to large 
differences in risk perception between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and the lack 
of a standard valuation tool for biotech projects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
All projects that create value find sufficient and adequate financing in perfect financial markets. 
Real world financial markets, however, are far from perfect. In the presence of market 
imperfections, investors may ration capital and value creating projects may be denied financing 
or only be able to obtain certain types of funding [2]. As a special type of new technology 
ventures, biotechnology companies may find it even harder to get financing [3]. First, biotech - 
especially biopharmaceutical companies - are characterised by a long development process and 
the high cash burn rates necessitate large investments [4]. Biotech is therefore perceived as one 
of the riskiest industries in our modern economy [5]. Second, regulatory uncertainty and a 
negative public opinion may hamper the search for financing [6]. Finally, the biotech 
technology and product development process are considered to be very complex [4].  
 
The very nature of venture capital companies (VCs) as financial intermediaries is to reduce 
information asymmetries and act in uncertain environments [7]. Venture capital is therefore an 
important source of funding for biotech companies, especially when large investment amounts 
are needed [8]. In this paper we qualitatively study the biotechnology investment decision 
process of VCs. The biotech sector is chosen because it is an interesting setting to study the 
supply of financing under extreme circumstances. Our research question is: How do the typical 
biotechnology characteristics influence the selection process of VCs? Does the VC selection 
process in biotech ventures differ from that in other technology ventures? 
 
Previous research indicates that VCs have different mechanisms to deal with risk or uncertainty 
in their selection process (Figure 1) [9]. First, VCs define their overall investment strategy.  
During the screening phase VCs check whether the investment proposal fits the VCs’ portfolio 
strategy.  
 
Second, VCs use thorough due diligence to reduce adverse selection and information 
asymmetry problems. Well performed screening and due diligence should lead to VCs 
financing the most valuable companies [10]. There is no consensus in the literature with respect 
to which criteria are most important in the investment decision of VCs. On the one hand, 
studies highlight the importance of the entrepreneurial management team as the most important 
factor. MacMillan et al. (1985, pp. 119), for example, argue that “There is no question that 
irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the 
jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a 
bet at all” [11]. Other studies stress on the other hand that the investment decision of VCs does 
not depend on one criterion, but that a combination of criteria is important. Fried & Hisrich 
(1994), for example, argue that not only the entrepreneur, but also the concept and potential 
return play a crucial role in the screening of investment proposals [12].  
 
Third, VCs may require higher hurdle rates for valuation purposes to take into account higher 
risk or uncertainty. Previous research points out that higher (perceived) technological risk 
increases the hurdle rate, i.e. the return potential that must be present in a proposal before it is 
considered as attractive [13] [14]. Finally, VCs may shift risk or uncertainty from the VC to the 
entrepreneur through contracting. To reduce agency risk VCs may write more comprehensive 
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contracts, i.e. contracts with more and more complete contract specifications, more use of 
preferred and/or convertible stock and a better alignment of management incentives through 
appropriate remuneration and bonding strategies [4] [15] [16].  
 
Even though the very nature of VCs is to reduce information asymmetries and act in uncertain 
environments, it is documented that the selection criteria of a VC are different for non-
technology-based proposals compared to technology-based proposals. UK VCs for example 
require higher hurdle rates and stress the need to address a larger market for technology-based 
companies [13]. Moreover, technology is seen as a more important risk factor than stage of 
development by UK VCs [14].  Therefore, we will stress the difference between biotech 
investments and other technology related investments in the current paper, rather than compare 
biotech investments with non-tech investments. 
 
We find that the first way to cope with high uncertainty is embedded in the VCs’ investment 
strategy. The majority of investors exclude investments in certain biotech segments because of 
regulatory uncertainty, the long time to develop technology into a market ready product and the 
difficulty to understand technology and product development. The due diligence process is 
more thorough for biotech companies compared to other technology-based companies. While 
previous literature stresses the entrepreneurial management team as most important investment 
criterion, we find that financial, technology and market criteria are more important in our 
setting, especially for early stage proposals. Management is important for later stage 
investments, however. This is explained by the development process of biotech companies: 
during the early stages technological progress is more important, whereas management and 
sales skills become more important as the company further develops. As a result, early stage 
investors are willing to invest in incomplete management teams as long as the scientists are 
willing to change positions as the company develops.  
 
Our results further indicate that VCs do not consider the standard valuation tools to be 
appropriate for valuing biotech companies.  They rely more heavily on qualitative data than on 
quantitative methods. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, VCs do not require higher hurdle 
rates for biotech investments compared to other technology-based investments. This may be 
explained by the fact that increasing the hurdle rate may increase the risk of adverse selection, 
inducing the best projects to seek money from cheaper sources. Moreover, contrary to the 
predictions of agency theory, we find no evidence that VCs require more complete contracts. 
This might indicate that it is not agency risk that increases the risk of biotech investments, 
compared to other technology-based companies.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section describes the method 
used in the study and the VC sector in Belgium. Section three gives an overview of the typical 
characteristics of a biotech investment proposal from the perspective of a VC. Section four 
describes how VCs deal with the distinctive biotech characteristics in their selection process. 
Finally, section five concludes and offers avenues for future research. We end with 
propositions that can be more formally tested in the future. 
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2. Method and research setting 
 
Given the lack of in-depth insight in the selection process of biotech proposals, we opt for a 
qualitative research design. Data are collected through semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires. Both interview guide and questionnaire are pre-tested with two sector 
specialists. We use interviews as a data collection method for several reasons. First, our pre-test 
indicated that VCs are not always willing to return comprehensive mail surveys but prefer face-
to-face interviews. It is often necessary to establish a relationship with the venture capital 
manager before receiving a response [18]. Second, research based solely on mail questionnaires 
may fail to obtain the full essence of a VC’s investment process [19]. It is, for example, 
difficult to get comprehensive answers on unprompted questions [13]. We supplement the 
interviews with a structured questionnaire, which includes both hard data on, for example, fund 
characteristics and investment criteria and Likert scales. The Likert scales, covering the pre-
investment mechanisms which VCs may use to handle risk or uncertainty, are based on 
previous research [4] [14]. The interviews provide qualitative insights into how VCs use these 
mechanisms. 
 
All interviews are done with Belgian venture capital managers between October 2003 and 
February 2004. In contrast with the US and the UK where most studies on venture capital are 
done, Belgium has a Continental European financial system. The venture capital industry is 
nevertheless quite well developed in Belgium compared to other European countries [20]. 
Figure 2 gives an overview of venture capital biotech investments in Belgium and the UK -
Europe’s most developed venture capital market- as a percentage of GDP from 1999 to 2003. 
Biotech investments are high in Belgium compared to the UK, except in 2003. This shows that 
Belgian VCs are active in the biotech sector and that the research setting is appropriate to study 
the investment behaviour of Continental European VCs. The major players within the Belgian 
venture capital sector are independent VCs, public sector VCs and semi-captives, with 
respectively 62%, 17% and 12% of the total number of investments in 2003 [21]. 
 
The population of Belgian biotech VCs is identified by using publications, trade directories and 
snowball sampling. We estimate that the total population of Belgian VCs with a potential 
interest in biotech proposals amounts to 25 of which 16 (64%) are included in the sample. 
There is a good balance between early stage and later stage VCs in our sample, ranging from 
seed financing specialists to pre-IPO investors (Table 1, Panel A), but most VCs have a broad 
investment strategy covering several stages of development. Eight out of sixteen VCs are 
independent and private. There are two independent quoted VCs, three university related VCs, 
two bank related VCs and one corporate VC (Table 1, panel B. Nine of the VCs are generalist 
investors with respect to sector preference, with no specialised biotech teams, while seven VCs 
are considered to be specialised investors in biotech (Table1, Panel C). The sample includes 
VCs that invested as little as €500,000 to as much as €194 million in biotech up to now. 
 
We carefully select fund managers or senior investment managers for the interviews.  They all 
have relevant experience in venture capital and more specifically in biotech investments. The 
interviewees were first contacted by phone; we additionally asked to prepare a questionnaire 
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before the interview. If interviewees did not complete the questionnaire before the interview, 
we asked them to complete the questionnaire at the end of the interview. 
 
During the interview, the two interviewers follow a guideline to minimise interviewer effects. 
The interviews last between one hour and a half and two hours. All interviews are transcribed 
verbatim. To ensure validity of the transcription process, the interviews are taped and one of 
the interviewers takes notes. Next to the interview, we collect data from the written 
questionnaires. For each of the pre-investment mechanisms VCs may use to deal with risk or 
uncertainty, we ask whether VCs use more of these mechanisms for biotech investments 
compared to other technology-based investments. We record responses on a 5-point Likert 
scale, where 1 equals strongly disagree, 3 equals neither agree nor disagree and 5 equals 
strongly agree. To test whether the median response is statistically different from 3 we use the 
non-parametric Signed Rank Test [22]. 
 
 
3. Venture capitalists’ perceptions of the specific biotech characteristics 
 
Biotech is perceived to be one of the riskiest industries in our modern economy [5]. This is 
explained by the main characteristics of biotech companies. First, biotech is characterised by a 
lengthy process to develop a technology into a market ready product, especially in the drug 
development segment. The whole process from the discovery phase to a market ready product 
takes on average 15 years [23]. The long path to a market ready product has several 
consequences. First, biotech companies are confronted with high failure probabilities. In the  
biopharmaceutical sector, for example, only one out of 5,000 compounds that emerge from pre-
clinical testing is introduced on the market [23]. Consistent with Evans and Varaiya (2003), 
VCs in our sample perceive pre-market risks as an important risk factor for biotech companies. 
Eleven interviewees respond unprompted that technological failure or unsuccessful research 
projects are an important risk for biotech companies. A typical statement by interviewees is: 
 
“There is a lot of risk associated with other technologies, but it normally has to do with 
market conditions and competitive business practises, once the product is on the market. 
The risks for biotech companies are nearly always pre-market and they cause a lot more 
damage to companies.” (Later stage biotech specialist)   
 
Second, given the long time to market, the probability of a technology becoming obsolete 
increases. Ten interviewees state that maintaining a technological lead is a risk factor for 
biotech companies. Although intellectual property rights can protect a biotechnology 
company’s technology, they do not protect biotech companies against superior technologies or 
products developed by competitors, nor against direct competition from large pharmaceutical 
companies. The following quotes illustrate: 
 
“The science may be good, you eventually may have a market ready product, which gets 
approval, but suddenly a new technology may rise only five years after your 
investment.” (Early and later stage biotech specialist) 
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“A trend we clearly recognise the last two years is the way especially large 
pharmaceutical companies look at patents. … Companies do not hesitate today to 
challenge  a  patent, even if they know they will not win, but merely hope to silence a 
competitor.”  (Early stage generalist ) 
 
Third, biotech requires large amounts of financing [4] [23]. An early stage specialist estimates 
that biotech start-ups require four to five times more capital at start than ICT start-ups. Ten 
interviewees consider financial risk and more specifically the high cash burn rates of biotech 
companies and the companies’ ability to attract future financing as an important risk factor.  
 
Finally, due to the long path to a market ready product in biotech, there is huge uncertainty 
about the potential exit route. Three interviewees explicitly mention higher uncertainty on a 
potential exit as a risk factor for biotech. A generalist investor states exit routes are often 
discussed before investing in an ICT company, while this is not possible in biotech. 
 
Next to the long path from technology to a market ready product, other risk factors are 
mentioned by the interviewees, for example regulatory issues. European biotech companies 
have to pass higher hurdles compared to their American counterparts because of regulatory 
fragmentation between countries. A biotech specialist highlights that the drug approval and 
reimbursements systems are still fragmented in the European Union. Further, a negative public 
opinion will usually not directly influence VCs’ investment decisions, but may influence their 
decision indirectly through its impact on governments and consequently on regulation. 
 
Finally, biotech technology and product development are more complex [4]. Understanding the 
technology and product development may present an extra difficulty, especially for generalist 
investors, but also for specialists. 
 
In summary, biotech investors identify three distinctive characteristics of biotech companies, 
namely a long path to a market ready product, regulatory difficulties and a technology which is 
difficult to understand. In the next section we discuss the impact of these distinctive 
characteristics on VCs’ selection process. 
 
4. Venture capital companies’ selection process 
 
When discussing the VCs’ selection process for biotech proposals, the results are organised 
along the logical flow of the selection process of VCs (Figure 1). VCs receive hundreds of 
proposals a year. During the first rough screening phase, VCs check whether the proposals 
correspond to their investment strategy, which includes among other issues, target industries, 
preferred stages of development, geographical location and minimum and maximum size of 
investment. This quick exercise reduces the number of proposals significantly. Second, 
investment proposals that pass the screening phase are examined in more detail during the due 
diligence phase. Finally, the parties have to agree on the valuation of the investment proposal 
and contracts have to be signed. We discuss each of the stages separately. 
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4.1. Investment strategy and initial screening  
 
One of the most radical ways to deal with the high risk environment is to exclude specific 
biotech proposals. This can either be based on the specific biotech segment, on the stage of 
development of the venture or on the VCs portfolio strategy. 
 
Ten VCs in our sample reject proposals from certain biotech segments without further scrutiny.  
First, because of the unclear regulatory environment and negative public opinion, 
biotechnology companies active in segments as genetically modified organisms and stem cell 
research may find it difficult to attract sufficient financing. Typical statements by interviewees 
are: 
 
“I would be interested to invest in plant biotech but the climate in Europe is against it. I 
think there is some very valuable research done in this segment, but the regulatory 
environment is the problem, not the companies, nor the companies’ business plans. 
Therefore we do not invest in that segment.” (Later stage biotech specialist) 
 
Second, the large financing needs of biopharmaceutical companies , make certain VCs 
unwilling to consider these ventures. This was expressed by one smaller VC as:  
 
“What we automatically exclude are drug discovery proposals. We do not have the 
funds for this. One has to leave this segment to the big players.” (Early and later stage 
generalist) 
 
Third, an exit is essential for VCs to realise a return on their investment. Difficulties 
surrounding the exit may cause VCs not to invest in particular biotech segments. For example, 
a later stage biotech specialist stated he has looked at neutraceutical companies in the past, but 
was unwilling to invest, because it is difficult to realise an exit in this sector. 
 
Next, given the difficulty to understand the biotech technology and product development, VCs 
lacking specialised teams may decide not to invest in particular biotech segments. As 
mentioned by several generalist investors: 
 
“If we cannot understand the biotech business plan, then we do not invest. One should 
not invest in what one does not understand.” (Early and later stage generalist)   
  
A second investment strategy followed by VCs is to exclude early stage proposals and focus on 
later stage deals. This is not specific for biotech investments, but consistent with the behaviour 
of VCs in other sectors.  The advantage of focusing on later stage deals is that the later a VC 
invests in a company, the lower the technological and pre-market risk is, which is the most 
important risk for biotech companies according to our interviewees. Additionally, future 
financing needs and uncertainty surrounding the exit route may be lower. A typical statement 
is:      
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“We do not invest in seed. Companies should have gone trough the phase of one or two 
customers. The product should have proven itself.” (Later stage generalist) 
 
A third VC portfolio strategy is to diversify [10] [24]. Financial theory states that when 
investors compose a portfolio of 10 to 15 lowly correlated investments, the portfolio risk is 
almost completely reduced to the systematic or market risk. Ten VCs diversify by investing in 
both technology and non-technology proposals, thereby assuming that the returns of technology 
and non-technology ventures are not highly correlated. On the other hand, two VCs invest 
exclusively in the biotech sector but diversify over the different biotech segments. Furthermore, 
VCs reduce the risk by investing in companies with multiple technology projects in the 
pipeline. According to the majority of investors, companies with only one technology project in 
the pipeline have to meet stricter criteria before they are deemed attractive. The following 
quotes illustrate the diversification strategy: 
 
“We try to offer our investors a balanced portfolio, therefore we diversify over sectors, but 
we also diversify within the biotech sector. If we have invested in one genomic company, we 
will not invest in another genomic company unless it is extremely  attractive.” (Early stage 
biotech specialist) 
 
“We reduce the technological risk by investing in companies which have several products in 
their pipeline. We do not like one-product companies.” (Early and later stage biotech 
specialist) 
 
Table 2 summarises the strategies investors use at the investment strategy and screening phase. 
Investors may exclude certain biotech sectors, invest in later stage deals and use a portfolio 
diversification strategy to deal with the specific biotech characteristics.   
 
4.2. Due diligence 
 
4.2.1. The due diligence process 
 
Based on a five point Likert scale (see method section), we find that VCs in our sample agree 
that biotech proposals require significantly more extensive due diligence compared to other 
technology-based investment proposals (p-value: 0.0234). Generalist VCs outsource part of 
their due diligence to external parties, because they do not have sufficient knowledge to carry 
out the due diligence internally. Specialised VCs rely on specialised investment managers to 
reduce risk or uncertainty. As one interviewee stated: 
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“We are a specialist investor because we have specialised people for each of the sectors we 
invest in. We will never invest in a company, if we have no one in our team who understands 
the business.” (Early stage biotech specialist) 
 
Specialised VCs, however, not solely rely on their internal investment managers. It is 
interesting to note that the importance of external validation is stressed even by VCs which are 
considered to be the leading Belgian specialists in biotech investments by their peers. Even the 
investment decision of highly specialised VCs is taking external information and validation into 
account. For example, some specialist investors mention that they are more keen to invest in a 
biotech company which has a strategic alliance, because it offers an external validation of the 
technology. This implies that internal and external information and validation are complements, 
rather than substitutes. 
 
 
4.2.2. Criteria 
 
Based on unprompted answers from the VCs we find that -in order of importance- financial 
elements, market, technology and entrepreneurial management team are the most important 
criteria within the due diligence phase of biotech companies.  Our research leads to categories 
of investment criteria, which are consistent with previous research. We report, however, some 
differences in the relative importance of the different categories with previous research [10] 
[11] [12] [25] [26].  
 
First, nine VCs mention financial elements as one of the most important requirement of a 
business plan. VCs require a business plan with a complete financial plan based on realistic 
assumptions. This is somewhat inconsistent with VCs assertion that it is extremely difficult to 
forecast the future of a biotech venture, given technological and market uncertainties. VCs 
nevertheless require biotech entrepreneurs to seriously consider these financial elements. 
 
VCs look beyond the current financing round: they anticipate follow-on financing and even 
require that sufficient funding is guaranteed to develop a venture before they invest in it. This, 
again, puts a strong burden on the venture, as it may lead to a chicken-and-egg problem. Early 
stage VCs require that the full investment cycle is laid out, while later stage VCs only want to 
commit themselves when the technology and market have been proven. As one interviewee 
stated: 
 
“There is a risk that investors underestimate the amount of funds needed to develop the 
business.  In that case, they get stuck somewhere in the middle of the process of creating a 
valuable business.  This is a very important risk for us and this risk is more important for 
biotech compared to other businesses.“ (Early and later stage generalist) 
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VCs further clearly fear dilution in subsequent financing rounds. This can largely be explained 
by the large financing needs of biotech companies. 
 
Second, market strategy is seen as a key requirement of a biotech business plan by eight VCs, 
of which four early stage VCs. Because of the high risks and uncertainties within the biotech 
sector, VCs require a well-developed market model. Entrepreneurs are forced to think 
thoroughly about the following questions before seeking support from VCs: Who will the 
company’s customers be? What will the company offer? How will the company create value?   
 
Third, six VCs mention IP strategy as an important prerequisite of a biotech investment. VCs 
reckon they focus more on IP strategy for biotech ventures compared to other technology-based 
ventures. Intellectual property rights are important, especially because they offer an external 
validation of the uniqueness of the technology and consequently reduce at least partially the 
uncertainty surrounding the technology. Intellectual property rights are further a requirement to 
be able to realise an appropriate return, although they offer no guarantee for success. As 
previously discussed, intellectual property rights do not protect biotech companies against 
superior, competing technologies or products and are not always effective in protecting the 
biotech companies against large competitors. 
  
The venture capital literature often suggests that it is the entrepreneurial management team, 
irrespective of other criteria, who fundamentally determines the investment decision of a VC. 
Much has been made in the venture capital literature on the importance of a quality 
management team [11] [25] [26]. Our findings do not support the prime importance of the 
management team, however, as only six VCs mention the entrepreneurial management team as 
an important requirement of a biotech business plan. We find that management is a more 
important factor for later stage investors than for early stage investors. A VC explains:  
 
“What one sees more often in biotech compared to other tech companies is that a 
biotech company evolves in two phases. In a first phase, a university professor has an 
idea and becomes an entrepreneur. In a second phase, the company has something that 
starts to look like a product. At that point in time, deals with customers have to be 
generated, …and scientists are generally not good at this. Management has to change 
as the company evolves…In the beginning they have to be very good in science and at 
the end they have to be able to sell, to close deals,….” (Early and later stage generalist) 
 
Our results support the finding of Clarysse et al. (2005) that early stage biotech investors focus 
more often on technology criteria than on management team criteria  [27]. Although early stage 
VCs accept purely scientific teams, scientific entrepreneurs should be willing to step down as 
CEO when the company evolves to the market stage. In line with Hellmann and Puri (2002), 
VCs may play an important role in bringing outsiders into the position of CEO [28]. The 
following quote illustrates: 
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“If we are confronted with a university professor who has absolutely no management 
talent but thinks he has it, then we will not invest…We are willing to invest in 
companies with an incomplete management team, if we have an influence [on the HR 
policy] and can do the recruiting.” (Early stage specialist) 
 
In summary, contrary to previous research, early stage investors do not require a complete 
management team from the start, but require to have an impact on the future composition of the 
management team, as the biotech company develops. Later stage investors, however, require a 
high quality and well balanced management team. 
 
 
4.3. Valuation 
 
A critical element in the negotiation process between the VC and the entrepreneur is the 
valuation of the business. A valuation is necessary to determine the required ownership 
percentage of the VC. Ten interviewees mention that they use discounted cash flow (DCF) and  
ten mention the use of multiples to value technology-based  proposals. This result is consistent 
with earlier studies on the valuation techniques used by VCs in Continental Europe [17]. The 
biotech setting clearly affects the valuation process of VCs. First, VCs find it harder to value 
biotech companies compared to other technology-based companies (p-value: 0.0039), but we 
find no evidence that VCs require higher hurdle rates contrary to expectations (p-value: 
0.1211). This may be explained by an increased probability of adverse selection, should VCs 
increase the required hurdle rate. Similar to banks, who are unable to raise interest rates 
indefinitely, VCs may not be able to raise cut-off rates of returns indefinitely, as high-quality 
companies will look for cheaper financing sources and the average or low-quality companies 
will be the only ones willing to accept the excessive conditions of the VC [29]. This results in 
VCs developing a strategy not to invest in high risk proposals, rather than increasing their 
required return. 
 
Second, multiples and DCF may be the most commonly used valuation techniques for other 
technology-based and non-technology-based investments [16], but they are less frequently used 
for valuing biotech investments. VCs believe multiples do not offer realistic and stable values 
in the case of biotech ventures. Using a P/E multiple on the current earnings of a biotech 
company, for example, often leads to a negative value. Although the DCF model theoretically 
holds in the biotech setting, half of our respondents indicate that the DCF method is more 
frequently used for valuing other technology-based companies. This contrasts with Barrow et 
al. (2001), who reported that VCs switch to the DCF method if the assumptions of the multiples 
method do not hold [30].  Instead of using the traditional quantitative models to value a 
company, VCs tend to rely more heavily on qualitative measures to value a biotech proposal. 
Two generalist VCs even call it mere guesswork. 
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Given the lack of a standard valuation tool, the difficulty to assess the future in a biotech setting 
and the VCs’ reliance on qualitative measures, it is not surprising that the most important 
reason why negotiations break down is disagreement concerning the value of the proposal. Ten 
interviewees mention they failed to close a deal due to disagree on valuation on at least one 
occasion in the previous three years. Furthermore, differences in risk perception between VCs 
and entrepreneurs make it even more difficult to agree on valuation. All VCs agree there are 
important differences in risk perception: entrepreneurs underestimate the risks. This was 
expressed by one interviewee as follows: 
 
“When the technology is validated, a lot of entrepreneurs assume they reached the finish. 
What they do not realise is that the story here only begins.” (Early and later stage biotech 
specialist) 
 
VCs attribute this difference in risk perception to entrepreneurs who are emotionally bounded 
to the project and underestimate risks in their enthusiasm, while VCs are experienced and 
therefore more realistic. VCs have seen numerous entrepreneurs, who are certain their 
invention will be extremely successful, but who eventually fail to become star performers. 
According to six interviewees, differences in risk perception are even stronger for biotech 
entrepreneurs than for other technology-based entrepreneurs. VCs attribute this greater 
difference to the long development path to turn technology into a market ready product and 
more specifically the larger financing needs and higher risks because of this lengthy process.  
 
4.4. Contracting 
 
A well-documented way to reduce agency risk is to use extensive contracts [15] [16]. Given the 
high risk environment, we expect that biotech investors write more extensive contracts, as this 
restricts the entrepreneur from taking actions to the detriment of the principal, in this case the 
VC. However, we find no evidence that VCs require more extensive contracts for biotech 
investments compared to other technology-based investments. First, the Likert scales indicate 
that VCs do not require more or more detailed contract specifications for biotech investments 
compared to other technology-based investments (p-value: 0.1875). Second, VCs may use 
remuneration and bonding strategies, i.e. arrangements that penalise entrepreneurs if they make 
decisions which are not in the interest of outside investors [31]. Appropriate remuneration and 
bonding strategies, which tie the payoff of the entrepreneur to that of the VC, can prevent moral 
hazard or ex post changes in behaviour to the detriment of the principal. However, we do not 
find that biotech investors require more alignment of management incentives through 
appropriate remuneration and bonding strategies for biotech investments compared to other 
technology-based investments (p-value: 0.6250). Next, preferred and/or convertible stock may 
be used in order to stimulate the entrepreneur to perform well and protect investors, as 
entrepreneurs generally hold common stock [32]. Again, VCs in our sample do not use more 
preferred and/or convertible stock for biotech investments compared to other technology-based 
investments (p-value: 0.7500).  
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The results from the Likert scales are consistent with the information collected from the 
interviews. Agency risk is neither mentioned directly nor indirectly by the majority of VCs 
interviewed. This indicates that agency risk is not necessarily (perceived to be) higher in 
biotech, but that uncertainty for both the VC and entrepreneur plays a more dominant role. In 
highly volatile, high R&D-intensive industries, where the actual outcome of a business is not 
necessarily determined by management commitment and competence, shifting risk beyond the 
control of the entrepreneurs from investors to entrepreneurs will be deemed as unfair and will 
therefore be expensive from the VCs’ point of view. Our results are in line with incomplete 
contract theory, which states that incomplete contracts are negotiated because of uncertainty 
and more attention is paid to active involvement in the investment ex-post [33]. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Previous research on UK VCs has shown that VCs use stricter selection criteria for technology-
based companies compared to non-technology-based companies. We focus on how the typical 
characteristics of biotech companies influence the selection process of Belgian VCs. The 
biotech setting is chosen because it represents an interesting setting to study the supply of 
financing under extreme circumstances. There is a long development path to turn a technology 
into a market ready product, there are issues of regulatory uncertainty, negative public opinion 
and difficulty to understand the technology and product development.  These are distinctive 
characteristics of biotech ventures. 
 
Table 2 summarises the main findings of our study. The VCs’ investment decision process 
usually starts with a rough screening to examine whether the proposal meets the VCs’ 
investment strategy. The most radical way in which VCs deal with the particularities of biotech 
companies is to define an investment strategy that excludes certain biotech segments or 
investment stages, in order to reduce the risk or uncertainty inherent to biotech. 
 
Proposals that fit the investment strategy and pass the screening phase are examined in more 
detail during the due diligence process. VCs combine information from the business plan with 
internal knowledge and information from external sources. Our results indicate that even highly 
specialised teams stress the importance of external validation. As a consequence, internal and 
external validation are complements, rather than substitutes.  
 
Financial, market and technology criteria are important investment criteria. Management is 
especially important for later stage investors. This is explained by the lengthy process of 
turning technology into a market ready product. During the company’s early stages of 
development, scientific progress is more important than market development. Later in the 
company’s development, management and sales skills become more important. As a 
consequence, most early stage investors are willing to invest in biotech companies with an 
incomplete, purely scientific team as long as VCs have the freedom to recruit managers when 
necessary. One may assume that investment criteria differ between different types of investors. 
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However, given our small sample size it is difficult to draw conclusions hereupon. This leads to 
the following proposition, to be tested in future research: 
 
Proposition 1: The selection criteria used by VCs depend on the characteristics of the 
investment proposal (e.g. stage of development, sector) and of the investor (e.g. independent 
versus captive, generalist versus specialist). 
 
VCs further reckon that IP is more important for biotech companies compared to other 
technology-based companies. VCs see IP rights as a requirement to invest, but realise that it is 
no guarantee for success. IP rights are not able to protect biotech companies in all cases, for 
example, against superior substitutes or against legal attacks from large pharmaceutical 
companies. We suspect that VCs nevertheless focus so much on IP rights, because next to the 
limited protection they offer, they provide an external validation of the uniqueness of the 
technology. Finally, given the large financing need and long development path to a market 
ready product, VCs focus extensively on future financing rounds.  
 
Next, valuation is essential to determine the required ownership percentage of a VC. VCs rely 
more on qualitative methods to value biotech investments compared to other technology-based 
companies. Contrary to expectations, we do not find that VCs require higher hurdle rates to 
compensate for higher risk or uncertainty. Valuation is nevertheless the most important 
stumbling block during negations between VCs and entrepreneurs. The discrepancy in 
perceived value between the entrepreneur and biotech investor is reinforced by differences in 
risk perception. All VCs agree that entrepreneurs underestimate the risks. Our results offer a 
clear call for more research on valuation in highly uncertain environments.  
 
Finally, contracting is a mechanism to reduce agency risk. Contrary to expectations based on 
agency theory, we do not find that VCs require more complete contracts for biotech ventures 
compared to other technology-based companies. This can be explained by incomplete contract 
theory: under high uncertainty, the parties in a contract are not able to include all contingencies. 
This might be an indication that agency risk is not (perceived as) higher in biotech, but that 
uncertainty for both the entrepreneur and VC plays a more dominant role. Incomplete contract 
theory predicts that higher uncertainty, which a VC cannot reduce through more thorough 
contracting, will be tackled by increased monitoring post-investment [15]. This leads to 
following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: VCs require the same standard contractual terms in highly uncertain 
environments as in less uncertain environments, but manage the uncertainty by more post-
investment monitoring and governance.  
 
A limitation of the present study is that it focuses only on the supply side in the investor-
investee relationship. We have not discussed the VCs’ investment decision process with 
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biotech and other technology-based entrepreneurs. It might well be that entrepreneurs view the 
decision process of VCs differently than the VCs themselves.  Second, given our small sample 
size it is difficult to distinguish between different types of VCs. With respect to valuation, for 
example, we find that the two bank related VCs use is the so-called venture capital method to 
value biotech companies. It is however difficult to conclude that bank related VCs use more 
financially-related and quantitative valuation methods compared to the other VCs who use 
more qualitative measures. These two bank related VCs are both later stage investors and more 
quantitative measures may be used simply because of reduced uncertainty in later stage 
investment proposals.  
 
Our results are especially important for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs should realise that an 
excellent technology is a necessary, but insufficient condition to attract the attention of 
investors. Entrepreneurs have to demonstrate their investor readiness by offering, on top of a 
solid IP strategy, a sound market analysis and a realistic financial plan to VCs. Furthermore, 
entrepreneurs of young biotech companies must be willing to change position over time as the 
company develops. It is not because the entrepreneur is a star scientist, that (s)he has sufficient 
talent to lead the company through the different stages of development, which require distinct 
qualifications. Finally, entrepreneurs should have realistic expectations with respect to the 
value of the venture when approaching external equity investors.  
 
Finally our results are important for policymakers. High tech companies are considered to be 
important drivers for economic development. VC represents an important source of funding for 
the development of biotech companies. Our study offers important recommendations to policy 
makers in order to bring VCs and biotech entrepreneurs closer together. First, more coherence 
is needed at a European level.  Existing regulatory market fragmentation due to differences in 
drug approval and reimbursement systems are barriers that are especially difficult to overcome 
for European entrepreneurial biotech companies. They are at a competitive disadvantage 
compared to their American competitors.  These barriers should therefore be removed. Further, 
increasing the investor readiness of entrepreneurs, especially with respect to market 
development and financial issues, is badly needed. Educational and support services could be 
set up to assist in these areas. 
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Figure 1: The selection process of a venture capital investment [12] [19] [34]*. 
 
 
 
 
 
* Our study focuses on the VCs activities after deal generation and before the actual investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Investments in biotechnology as a percentage of GDP [21]. 
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Table 1: Overview of the sample by investment stage and type of investor 
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By ownership 
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 By specialisation 
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Seed 9  Independent quoted VC 2 Specialist investor 7 
Start-up 12  Independent private VC 8 Generalist investor 9 
Expansion 10  University related VC 3   
Replacement capital 3  Bank related VC 2   
Buyout 3  Corporate VC  1   
Note: Venture capital funds may invest in different stages of the investment cycle. 
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Table 2: The impact of biotech characteristics on the selection process of venture capitalists 
 
Venture capitalists’ selection process Strategy to manage biotech characteristics Biotech characteristics 
-Regulatory difficulties 
-Long path to a market ready product and large financing needs -Exclude specific biotech sectors 
-Difficulty to understand 
-Exclude stages of investment -Risk and uncertainty 
Investment strategy and screening  
-Use portfolio strategy: 
• diversify within technology and non-technology  sectors 
• diversify within the biotech sector 
• preference for companies with multiple technology products in pipeline 
-Risk and uncertainty 
-Process: internal and external validation as complements  -Difficulty to understand technology 
-Criteria:  
 
• financial criteria -Large financing needs over long path to a market ready product 
• market criteria -Long path to market ready product 
• IP criteria -Difficulty to understand 
• willingness to change team (early stage deals) 
Due diligence 
• complete management team (later stage deals) 
-Long path to a market ready product 
-Qualitative valuation measures rather than quantitative valuation methods 
-Large financing needs over a long path to a market ready product 
-Risky and uncertain Valuation 
-No higher hurdle rates  
Contracting -Contracts not more complete -Not more agency risk 
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